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An increasing international applicability of a given type of education encourages students to 
invest more effort when studying. Governments, on the other hand, face an incentive to divert 
the provision of public education away from internationally applicable education toward 
country-specific skills. This would mean educating too few engineers, economists and 
doctors, and too many lawyers. If the total tax rate is kept constant, then replacing part of 
existing wage taxes with graduate taxes, collected also from migrants, would improve 
efficiency. It could even allow for a Pareto-improvement. 
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expressed. 1. Introduction
There is wide political consensus within the European Union that decisions on public
education should be left to individual member states. Beneﬁts, however, accrue partly to
other member states through migration. By providing skilled immigrants, investments in in-
ternationally applicable education generate positive externalities to other member states. As
individual member states have no incentives to internalize these externalities, decentralized
decision-making tends to lead into ineﬃciently low investments in internationally applicable
degrees. Increased mobility of the highly educated generates incentives to scale back public
ﬁnancing, recently exempliﬁed in the introduction of top-up fees in England. Before that
Sweden replaced a system of income-contingent loans, in eﬀect between 1989 and 2001, by
ordinary annuity loans. (CSN 2002). Sweden abandoning its income-contingent loan system
may reﬂect the pressures of increased labor mobility. Of all of those who graduate from
Swedish universities, 15 percent emigrate. (Eklund 1998). Unlike income-contingent loans,
annuity loans do not require cooperation from foreign tax authorities.
Even though the possibility of migration reduces the incentives of individual governments
to provide internationally applicable education, it also encourages students to study more
intensively, by increasing the expected returns to human capital. Private eﬀort and public
provision are complements in the formation of human capital. Increased complementary
investments by students may also encourage more public investments.
This paper examines the eﬀects of migration on the provision of country-speciﬁca n d
internationally applicable public education when public and private investments in human
capital are complements. Including these two aspects of human capital formation allows
1evaluation of whether the brain gain eﬀect would swamp the brain drain eﬀect in the public
provision of education, so that an increased mobility would result in higher public investment.
The framework used allows the member states of the common labor market, from now on
referred to as federation, to diﬀer in general productivity. The analysis considers both the
case in which member states levy only wage taxes on their residents, and also a case in
which member states levy also graduate taxes which are paid to the country which provided
education independently of future domicile. Graduate tax is used to denote a tax which is
collected from university graduates, without a requirement that tax revenue collected from
them would have to equal the costs of providing education. Such graduate taxes give the
country which educated migrants a stake also in their productivity gains earned elsewhere.
This study focuses on education targeted to young adults.1
The main results are the following. If there are no graduate taxes and governments
care only about the citizens who stay, then governments tend to reduce investment in in-
ternationally applicable education when its applicability increases. If a government attaches
as u ﬃciently high positive weight also on the utility of emigrants, then it might increase
investment in internationally applicable education when it becomes more mobile. Indepen-
dently of the weight attached to emigrants and of the productivity diﬀerential between the
two countries, replacing part of the current wage taxes by a graduate tax always leads to
higher welfare and more eﬃcient investment in internationally applicable education than
the current system, provided that the aggregate tax rate does not increase. In addition,
1In the spirit of Tiebout (1956), parents valuing education may buy better education for their children
by paying higher taxes. Such a mechanism is much weaker in higher education, as young adults may go to
a university in a diﬀerent city, or even country, than in which their parents pay taxes.
2this study ﬁnds that the welfare eﬀects of labor mobility may be non-monotonic. For the
sake of argument, consider rich and poor member states of the European Union. Increasing
international applicability of human capital beneﬁts rich member states by allowing them to
attract skilled workers from poor member states. However, if migrating to a rich member
state becomes very attractive, this may discourage the government of the poor member state
to provide citizens internationally applicable education. The rich member state would also
be hurt by losing a base of potential immigrants.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews literature. Section 3 develops the
model. Section 4 presents the results, and section 5 concludes.
2. Literature Review
A key question in ﬁscal federalism literature is whether decentralized outcomes are eﬃ-
cient or not, and whether centralization would increase or decrease welfare. Justman and
Thisse (1997) show that a government that maximizes the utility of immobile residents
reduces investment in public education when the educated become mobile. Their model
includes only one type of education. Another ineﬃciency is identiﬁed by Wildasin (2000).
When the highly-skilled become mobile, tax competition tends to erode any taxes they have
to pay. This shifts the burden of ﬁnancing public education to immobile tax bases. If tax-
ation relies heavily on less mobile and less educated workers, then public education would
imply regressive redistribution. It seems unlikely outcome, in that governments must gain
political support from the citizens staying.2
2Ad i ﬀerent view on tax competition may arise if governments cannot commit to taxation, either explicitly
or implicitly. Andersson and Konrad (2003) and Thum and Uebelmesser (2003) suggest that labor mobility
could increase investment in education as it serves as a commitment device to low taxation. Recently, also
3Brain drain literature, pioneered by Grubel and Scott (1966) and Bhagwati and Hamada
(1974), highlights the losses that emigration imposes on source countries. This view has been
questioned by recent literature, suggesting that emigration may beneﬁt the source country.
Stark et al. (1997) show that when students invest privately in their human capital, some
migration from developing countries to developed countries may actually beneﬁt the country
of origin. The mechanism is as follows. A possibility to migrate to a richer country increases
the expected return to human capital investment in a poor country, thus encouraging private
investment. Even with a part of high-skilled workers migrating, this initial brain gain may
dominate, so that the less developed country can end up with a higher average level of
human capital per worker with migration than without it. The empirical analysis by Beine
et al. (2001) shows that such a beneﬁcial brain drain cannot be ruled out. Finally, Stark
and Wang (2002) show that a possibility of migration to a richer country may serve as a
substitute for subsidies for human capital formation, thus potentially beneﬁting also the
country of emigration. These contributions focus on private investment in human capital,
and they study the use of migration quotas by less developed countries. This study focuses
on public provision of education, in the presence of complementary private investment. It
assumes that there are no legal restrictions to migration, consistent with the EU principles
of free mobility.
Also Poutvaara (2004) studies public and private provision of diﬀerent types of educa-
tion with diﬀerent tax rules. This paper diﬀers in three respects. First, Poutvaara (2004)
assumes that human capital depends only on individual ability and investment in educa-
Haupt and Janeba (2004) have studied the eﬀect of migration on education and redistribution in the absence
of commitment.
4tion, while this paper allows human capital to depend also on private investment in eﬀort.
Including simultaneously complementary public and private investments in human capital
allows analysis of whether the brain drain eﬀect could be swamped by the brain gain eﬀect
in the public provision of education. This study considers both the extensive margin of how
many students are educated, and the intensive margin of how much they invest in their
eﬀort, and how much human capital is generated. Second, Poutvaara (2004) models only
a federation of symmetric member states, while this paper allows member states to diﬀer.
Allowing for diﬀerent productivities is important to allow comparisons with the brain gain
literature, which has focused on unilateral migration from poor to rich countries. Third,




A federation consists of two member states, labeled A and B. Both member states are
populated by overlapping generations of heterogeneous citizens who become educated and
work, and by recipients of government transfers who neither participate in production nor
migrate. Each citizen lives for two periods, becoming educated in his or her member state
o fb i r t hi nt h eﬁrst period, and choosing where to live, work and pay taxes in the second
period. There are two types of education, labeled i and s. These subscripts refer to whether
the education is internationally applicable (i)o rc o u n t r y - s p e c i ﬁc( s). Only those with inter-
nationally applicable education may migrate. Students with ability-intensive internationally
applicable education may also invest privately eﬀort in their education. Such investment
5cannot be veriﬁed by the government.
The education is provided publicly. To focus on government decisions on what type of
education to provide, it is assumed that the tax rates are exogenous and the same in the two
member states.3 The government budget constraint is balanced by adjusting transfers to
the rest of the population. The governments have two diﬀerent tax instruments: A general
wage tax rate τw,t is levied on all wage income generated domestically in period t, while
t h e r em a ya l s ob eag r a d u a t et a xr a t eτg,t, paid by graduates to the member state which
initially provided their education. In other words, also migrants pay their graduate taxes to
their member state of origin. The total tax rate is then τt = τw,t + τg,t, satisfying τw,t ≥
0,τg,t ≥ 0,τt < 1. Governments are benevolent, choosing the education that maximizes the
after-tax consumption of their remaining citizens, and possibly attaching a positive weight
also on their migrating citizens. The values of all exogenous parameters with time index are
known at least one period ahead, allowing for both a steady-state and a transition path.
The timing of actions in each period is as follows. First, those entering their second period
of life with internationally applicable education learn what would be their wage in the other
member state, then deciding whether to migrate or not. Second, governments decide on
the provision of public education. Third, the educated supply labor and pay taxes, and the
government collects wage taxes and ﬁnances education. Fourth, those becoming educated
decide on their investment in eﬀort.4
3Keen and Marchand (1997) use the same assumption when they study the eﬀect of ﬁscal competition on
the composition of public expenditure in the presence of mobile capital. They ﬁnd that in a non-cooperative
equilibrium, public expenditures are biased toward the provision of public inputs at the expense of local
public goods beneﬁting immobile residents.
4The results would remain the same with an alternative ordering of events, as long as migration decisions
are made after potential migrants know their productivity elsewhere, and migration takes place before
supplying labor.
63.2. Production
The production function is linear in the two types of human capital. Aggregate produc-
tion in member state A in period t is given by Y A
t = HA
i,t+HA
s,t,i nw h i c hHA
k,t, k ∈ {i,s},i st h e
post-migration stock of eﬀective human capital of type k,a sd e ﬁned in the following subsec-
tion. Labor markets are competitive, so that gross rates of return to human capital of both
types are equal to unity. Income diﬀerences then follow from diﬀerent amounts of human





k,t, k ∈ {i,s}, is the post-migration stock of eﬀective human capital of type k.
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that 0 <x t ≤ 1. This formulation allows for both
a symmetric and an asymmetric federation.
Citizens diﬀer in their productivity if they would complete education i, while they have
identical productivity if they would complete education s.H u m a nc a p i t a lo ft y p ei is a joint
product of teaching and studying.5 For a citizen with ability a and individual eﬀort et−1 in
period t − 1, the individual human capital stock is before eventual migration in period t
hi,t(a,et−1)=a + et−1. (1)
Human capital with education of type s is for all individuals normalized to unity: hs,t(a)=
1.
The monetarized cost of eﬀort et is βe2
t. This formulation of an increasing marginal
cost guarantees a bounded investment in e. The resource cost for universities of education
5All results would hold if also human capital of type s would be a joint product of teaching and studying.
7k,k ∈ {i,s}, is ck,t in member state A and xtck,t in member state B. The assumption that
the government’s costs of providing education in member state B are a multiplicative xt of
those in state A captures the stylized fact that as a signiﬁcant part of the costs of providing
education are wage costs, an increase in the general level of productivity also causes an
increase in the cost of providing education.
Ability a follows, in both member states, a continuous distribution between 0 and a,w i t h
density function f(a). It is assumed that a>1 and that parameter values are such that at
least the government of member state A always invests in both types of human capital. The
utility of the educated is linear in their consumption, net of the monetarized eﬀort cost of
investment in education, and all consumption takes place in the second period.
3.3. Migration
As h a r eγt of internationally applicable education in one member state is applicable in
the other member state in case of migration, satisfying 0 <γ t ≤ 1. Each individual faces
an individual-speciﬁc random component related to productivity abroad, unknown to the
government and the individual before investing in education but known to the individual
before migration. The random component takes a multiplicative form 1+ε,s ot h a tε is
uniformly distributed between −0.5 and 0.5. Some individuals would then lose an individual-
speciﬁc share of their productivity in case they emigrate, while others would beneﬁtf r o ma
boost in their productivity abroad. This allows for a possibility of mutually beneﬁcial brain
exchange between countries, helping to capture the stylized fact that there is often migration
of people with same education in both directions.
A productivity diﬀerential between the member states if xt < 1 would further motivate
8migration from member state B to member state A. At the same time, it would increase the
threshold value of the positive random term needed to induce migration from member state
A to member state B. An individual with internationally applicable education would then
emigrate from member state A to member state B if and only if
γt(1 + ε)xt > 1, (2)
and from member state B to member state A if and only if γt(1 + ε) >x t. Parameter
values xt and γt are assumed to satisfy xt >γ t/2,γt > 2/3.T h eﬁrst assumption guarantees
that not everyone with internationally applicable education emigrates from member state B.
The second assumption guarantees that there is at least some migration between symmetric
member states, that is with xt =1 . With these assumptions, (2) deﬁnes the cutoﬀ level
of εA
t =m i n ( 1 /(γtxt) − 1, 1
2) below which citizens with internationally applicable education
remain in member state A in period t. Therefore, there is no migration from member state
Ai fγtxt ≤ 2/3. Correspondingly, the cutoﬀ level below which citizens remain in member
state B is given by εB
t = xt/γt − 1.F o r s i m p l i c i t y ,ε is assumed to not be correlated with
individual ability a. By this assumption and the properties of a uniform distribution, the
share of remaining internationally applicable human capital is given by F(ε
j
t).
When there is also some migration from member state A, F(ε
j
t)=1 /(xtγt) − 1/2 is the
share of those with education i who do not migrate. The probability that an individual with










9As long as xtγt > 2/3, there is emigration from member state A. The probability of
emigration reaches its peak of 0.5 when γt =1and xt =1 . The probability of emigration










As migration occurs only when the productivity of migrants is higher in the other member
state, brain exchange increases the aggregate production. Note that the productivity of all
migrants with education i is higher in their new member state of residence, as otherwise
they would not migrate in the ﬁrst place. The average productivity multiplier of migrants













If γtxx ≤ 2/3, there is no migration as pA
t =0 , and thus bA
t is not determined in the
model. To simplify future notation, bA
t =1if pA
t =0 . The average productivity multiplier










If the member states are identical, that is, xt =1 , the average productivity multiplier
is the same for migrants from both member states. The productivity multiplier reports the
average post-migration productivity of the pre-migration human capital of migrants. The
average productivity of migrants from member state A is bA
t times as high in member state
6With ε being uniformly distributed between −0.5 and 0.5, the highest value of 1+ε is 3
2, while the
lowest value with migration is 1+ε1
t = 1
xtγt.
10B as it would have been in member state A. The average productivity of migrants from
member state B is bB
t /xt t i m e sa sh i g hi nm e m b e rs t a t eAa si tw o u l dh a v eb e e ni nm e m b e r
state B.
3.4. Private Investment in Education
By (1), (3) and (5), a student in internationally applicable education in member state A








t (1 − τt)b
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provided that there is a positive probability of migration, that is pA
t > 0.T h eﬁrst two terms
are the discounted value of expected future after-tax income, with an individual discount
factor ρ, 0 <ρ≤ 1. The third term is the immediate eﬀort cost. This formulation results in

















t =0 ,t h e nt h eo p t i m a le ﬀort choice is eA
t−1 =( 1− τt)ρ/(2β).
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The equations (7) and (8) imply that the investment in eﬀort by students receiving
education i is increasing in xt and in γt in both member states.
3.5. Public Education and Aggregate Production
The government has access to entrance examinations which allow it to screen applicants
to the ability-intensive education. While not used in all countries, entrance examinations or
results from baccalaureate or other tests are commonly used to select those who are admitted.
The cutoﬀ level of ability chosen by the government j, j ∈ {1,2},i sd e n o t e di np e r i o dt by
a
j
t, below which citizens are educated in ﬁeld s a n da b o v ew h i c hi nﬁeld i.T h u s ,t h es t o c k




t−1), and the pre-migration

















The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side reports that part of education i which depends
on individual ability, and the second term the part determined by individual eﬀort. Post-
migration internationally applicable human capital in member state j consists of share (1−p
j
t)
of domestically created human capital and human capital of those who have immigrated from
member state k, k 6= j:
H
j











12The government in each member state collects wage taxes at rate τw,t from the educated
to ﬁnance exogenous public consumption G
j
t and public education, and returns the rest of
the tax revenue to citizens not participating in production, like the elderly. The transfer in
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t )+ci(1 − F(b a
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t + xtcsF(b a
B
t )+xtci(1 − F(b a
B
t )) + T
B
t .
The left-hand side is the government budget revenue. The ﬁrst term gives wage tax
revenue from the educated residing in the countr y ,a n dt h es e c o n dt e r mg r a d u a t et a xr e v e n u e
from those who received their education in the country. The right-hand side reports the
expenditures, consisting of the exogenous revenue requirement, the costs of providing the
two types of education, and the budget-balancing endogenous transfer T
j
t .
Even when restricting the analysis to a utilitarian government, important questions re-
main. First, how does the government value the utility of diﬀerent generations? As current
education aﬀects future production capacity and income, the government faces an intergen-
erational trade-oﬀ. Second, how does the government value the utility of emigrants and
immigrants?
13The analysis proceeds under the following assumptions. The government values the
current consumption and the future income that investment in education generates for its
citizens in the following period, using the same discount rate as individuals. The government
values the after-tax income of its emigrating citizens, compared to the income of remaining
citizens, at rate α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The government weights the graduate tax revenue that it is
able to collect from emigrants in the same way as it values the income of its remaining citi-
zens. The privately chosen eﬀort cost of students with internationally applicable education
does not enter into government decision-making. The government attaches a zero weight to
immigrants.7 The social welfare function is given by
SWF
A
t =( 1 − τt+1)H
A
s,t +( 1− p
A































The ﬁrst line gives the utility of consumption in the current period of those citizens who
stay, being the sum of the disposable income of those with education s, those with education
i, and transfers to the rest of the population. The second line gives the sum of the discounted
value of production of those citizens who stay, and graduate tax revenue from the emigrants.
The allocation of these resources between consumption and investment in education are
decided only in the following period. The third line reports the social valuation of the utility
of emigrants. The ﬁrst term is the valuation of the consumption of the emigrants in the
7Importantly, the results are independent of whether the government also values the utility of immigrants
or not. The assumption of zero weight simpliﬁes notation.
14current period, and the second term is the discounted value of the consumption of emigrants
in the following period.
As the tax rates are given, the consumption of the educated in the current period is
exogenous from the government’s perspective. Omitting this and other exogenous variables,

























The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side consists of current transfers to the rest of the
population. These are directly aﬀected by the costs of education currently provided. The
second term is the discounted value of the income accruing to those with country-speciﬁc
education in the following period. As the government values the income accruing to diﬀerent
groups of citizens in the same way, this term does not depend on future taxation. The third
term is the discounted value of income accruing to those with internationally applicable
education who stay. The fourth term is the discounted social valuation of the after-tax
income of emigrants. The ﬁfth term is the discounted value of graduate tax revenue from


























This section focuses on education policy when no changes in taxes or productivity diﬀer-
ential x are expected in the following period. For simplicity, the time indices from the tax
rates and parameters x,pA,p B,b A and bB are omitted.
4.1. Welfare eﬀects of graduate taxes
Governments choose the cutoﬀ levels of ability that maximizes their objective functions.
Diﬀerentiating SWF
A
t with respect to aA
t g i v e sa st h eﬁrst-order condition













t ) − ci.
On the left-hand side, we have the marginal social beneﬁt of a student receiving country-
speciﬁc education. This is independent of ability. On the right-hand side, we have the
marginal social beneﬁt of a student receiving internationally applicable education. This
value is increasing in the student’s ability. The ﬁrst-order condition allows us to solve for
the cutoﬀ level of ability below which the government provides country-speciﬁc education,




ρ − cs + ci
ρ[1 − pA + pAbA(1 − τ)α + pAbAτg]
− e
A. (9)
Comparative statics yield that investment in education i is increasing in cs and α and
decreasing in ci and β,a s∂eA/∂β < 0. Correspondingly, the ﬁrst-order condition of the
16SWF
B




xρ − xcs + xci
ρ[(1 − pB)x + pBbB(1 − τ)α + pBbBτg]
− e
B. (10)
A general result with graduate taxes is derived.
Proposition 1 Governments invest more in internationally applicable education with grad-
uate taxes than with only domicile-based taxation. Investment in internationally applicable
education is increasing in the graduate tax rate.
Proof. Insert (7) into (9) and (8) into (10). The ﬁr s tt e r m so nt h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo f
the resulting expressions are decreasing in τg, while the second terms are independent of it.
Notice that this result is independent of the weight assigned to emigrants, and of the
relative importance of private investment in eﬀort. A central result is then:
Proposition 2 Allowing member states to levy graduate taxes is welfare improving.
Proof. See Appendix.
4.2. International applicability and education policy
While the analysis of the welfare eﬀects of graduate taxes yields general results, welfare
eﬀects of changes in the international applicability parameter γ are more diﬃcult to deter-
mine. To simplify, the analysis focuses on two polar cases: a federation of two symmetric
member states, and an asymmetric federation in which migration goes only from the poor
to the rich member state.
17An increase in international applicability of human capital encourages private investment
in it. Given that private and public investments are complementary, this would leave the
eﬀect of an increased international applicability of education i on public investment in it a
priori unclear. On one hand, brain drain eﬀect would push the government to reduce public
investment in it, while brain gain eﬀect would render investing in it more attractive. Remark-
ably, this analysis ﬁnds that the brain drain eﬀect always dominates in public investment,
provided that the government cares only about its citizens staying.
Proposition 3 If α = τg =0and x =1 , then governments always reduce investment in
internationally applicable education when its applicability increases.
Proof. See Appendix.
Due to the presence of the brain gain eﬀect, however, the aggregate stock of interna-
tionally applicable human capital may either increase or decrease when its international
applicability increases:
Proposition 4 If α = τg =0and x =1 , then an increase in the applicability of interna-
tionally applicable education may result in either a larger or smaller pre-migration stock of
it.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4 suggests that in addition to the cost of private eﬀort, β, also ability distribu-
tion plays an important role in determining whether an increase in international applicability
of internationally applicable human capital increases or decreases its formation. The intu-
ition is as follows. If the density of abilities around the marginal ability of internationally
18applicable education is low, then the negative eﬀe c ta tt h ee x t e n s i v em a r g i nf r o mr e d u c e d
public provision is small, and the positive eﬀect from the increased private eﬀort at the
intensive margin dominates. On the other hand, if the density of abilities around the cutoﬀ
level is high, then an increase in the minimum ability above which the government provides
internationally applicable education excludes a large number of students, and the extensive
margin may dominate.
Importantly, an increased mobility of labor need not always reduce total resources used
to ﬁnance education. Whether this is the case or not depends on which type of education
is more expensive. Also when internationally applicable education is less expensive, an
increased probability of migration reduces individual government’s incentives to invest in it.
When the government attaches the same weight to emigrants as to citizens staying,
increased mobility may lead to either a larger or smaller investment in internationally ap-
plicable education. On the one hand, eﬃciency gains from brain exchange for emigrants
encourage governments to invest more in internationally applicable education. On the other
hand, governments are pushed toward less investment because they lose tax revenue from
emigrants.
Proposition 5 Assume that x =1 . Governments with a suﬃciently high α may increase
investment in internationally applicable education when its applicability increases, provided
that τw is not too high. Ceteris paribus, a decrease in β widens the scope for the government
to increase investment in i when γ increases.
Proof. To prove its existence, set τw =0 , cs = ci, x =1and α =1in (9), after inserting
(7). Then diﬀerentiating yields ∂b aA
t /∂γ > 0 by γ ≥ 2/3. Without restrictions on the value
19of τw, cs,o rci, ∂2b aA
t /∂γ∂β > 0 in (9).
The latter ﬁnding relates to results by Stark et al. (1997) and Stark et al. (2002): a pos-
itive probability of migration encourages private investments in human capital. The results
of this analysis arise from a common labor market of two symmetric countries. Previous
literature on brain drain and brain gain has focused on migration from a less developed
country to a more developed country. (See Stark et al. 1997, Beine et al. (2001) and Stark
and Wang (2002)
Assume next an asymmetric federation with γx ≤ 2/3. Parallel to the analysis of a
symmetric federation,
Proposition 6 If α = τg =0and γx ≤ 2/3, the government of member state B always
reduces investment in internationally applicable education when its applicability increases.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition shows that even as brain gain from the possibility of migration intensi-
ﬁes, the government of the poorer member state still reduces its investment in internationally
applicable human capital, as its applicability increases. Interestingly,
Proposition 7 An increased probability of emigration from member state B to member state
A, resulting from an increase in γ or a decrease in x, may either increase or decrease welfare
in member state A when α = τg =0and γx ≤ 2
3.
Proof. See Appendix.
To summarize, the welfare eﬀects of international applicability may be non-monotonic.
Also the member state beneﬁting from immigration may be hurt if its attractiveness increases
20too much, relative to the other member state. The reason why an increase in the mobility of
labor from the poorer to the richer member state may decrease welfare in the richer member
state hinges on the policy response of the government in the poorer member state. If a further
increase in the probability of emigration results in the government of the poorer member
state switching to oﬀering country-speciﬁc education, the richer member state suﬀers also as
it no longer receives immigrants and the tax revenue they would oﬀer.
5. Conclusion
This paper shows that decentralized decision-making on public education encourages the
member states of the European Union to distort the provision of public education away from
internationally applicable education, toward country-speciﬁc skills. If governments focus on
the utility of those citizens (and voters) who stay, they reduce the provision of internationally
applicable education even when students would increase complementary private investment
in eﬀort. This analysis thus suggests that the brain drain eﬀect would dominate the brain
gain, at the extensive margin of a government deciding how many students it provides
internationally applicable education. At the intensive margin of students deciding on their
complementary private investment in eﬀort, an increase in international applicability results
in more eﬀort. The net eﬀect can then go either way.
Whether the behavioral responses at the intensive margin by students or at the extensive
margin by governments dominate, behavioral responses at the extensive margin lead to
ineﬃciently low number of students receiving internationally applicable education. As a
remedy, this study suggests introducing graduate taxes, paid according to the same rules
independently of future domicile. Giving member states a stake in eﬃciency gains also earned
21elsewhere would encourage governments to invest more in human capital beneﬁting also the
other member states. The enlargement of the European Union increases potential beneﬁts
of establishing graduate tax contracts or income-contingent loans. With current tax rules,
incentives of citizens and those of governments would diverge. Students would ﬁnd incentives
to study for migration, thanks to higher expected earnings elsewhere. Governments, on the
other hand, would face incentives to educate students to stay, by oﬀering them too little
internationally applicable human capital, and too many country-speciﬁc skills.
This analysis relies on several simplifying assumptions, some of which should not change
the underlying results, while others can be expected to aﬀect policy conclusions. It assumes
that production technologies are linear in the two types of human capital. This implies that
wages of a given occupation do not change as a result of changes in the number of those
educated in that occupation. This assumption should not aﬀect any qualitative results. This
paper analyzes the eﬀects of marginal changes in international applicability or graduate tax
rates. Any changes in the relative wage rates are induced eﬀects of changes in the relative
stocks, and are thus induced second-order eﬀects. A quantitative analysis of non-marginal
changes should, naturally, aim at capturing complementarities and substitutabilities in pro-
duction. Also, tax rates are taken as given, following Keen and Marchand (1997). Endog-
enizing these tax rates is left for future research, as are possible interactions that such tax
rates or educational investments could have with public provision of infrastructure.
Perhaps the most important assumption is that the governments are benevolent, and
do not suﬀer from the time-consistency problem. In the analyzed model with benevolent
governments and without the commitment problem, there is no motivation for relying on
22income-contingent loans, as opposed to graduate taxes. Allowing for a commitment prob-
lem or governments which are not entirely benevolent would likely to change this. In a
world where the benevolence of governments is not universally guaranteed, constitutional
design has to trade-oﬀ the adverse selection problem and the need to tame Leviathan gov-
ernments. Accepting a certain degree of adverse selection would then be optimal, and could
be interpreted as a federation’s insurance premium against potential abuses by governments.
Voluntary contracts would also solve the time-consistency problem that may arise even when
governments are benevolent.
Appendix.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
Welfare eﬀects of education policy of either member state can be divided into internal-
ized eﬀects and externalities on the other member state. Country-speciﬁc education does
not generate externalities, while internationally applicable education generates a positive
externality to the other member state as the other member state beneﬁts from migrants
who pay wage taxes there. By Proposition 1, an increase in the graduate tax rate increases
the provision of internationally applicable education. As either country could have left its
education policy unchanged, both countries perceive their own social welfare to increase as a
result of providing more internationally applicable education. But as this increases also the
welfare of the other member state, it clearly increases the sum of welfare in the two member
states.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .





























The ﬁrst term is positive, and the second negative. Notice that when both types of education
are provided, social surplus from providing education s has to exceed that from providing
education i with a =0 .T h a ti s ,ρ − cs > (1 − p)ρeA − ci. By (3) and (7), this implies that



























4 > 0. This condition always holds as γ ≤ 1.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .
It is useful to write the stock of internationally applicable human capital explicitly as a
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24The last line uses (9) and (7). The ﬁrst term is negative as ∂b aj(γ)/∂γ > 0 by Proposition
3. The second term is positive by γ>2/3.I ff(b aj(γ)) → 0,t h eﬁrst term vanishes. Then
the second term dominates, and ∂ e H
j
i /∂γ > 0.I fβ →∞ ,t h e n∂ e H
j
i /∂γ < 0 by Proposition
3.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 .
With a = τg =0and (8), (10) simpliﬁes to
b a
B =
























This is positive if and only if



















On the other hand, we have a requirement that in order to have any country-speciﬁc
education being provided, it must hold that the expected social surplus from providing this
exceeds that of providing internationally applicable education for a citizen with zero ability.
That is, ρx − xcs >ρ (1 − pB)xeB − xci. Inserting yields
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This simpliﬁes as 9
16 + x3
γ3 − 3x2
4γ2 > 0.I f x ≥ γ, this always holds as the sum of the
two last terms is positive. Assume next that x<γ . To simplify notation, deﬁne y ≡ x/γ,
noting that 0 <y<1. What remains to prove is that g(y)= 9
16 + y3 − 3
4y2 > 0∀y ∈ (0,1).
Diﬀerentiating g(y),w eﬁnd that it is decreasing in the area to be studied when y<1
2,a n d
increasing when y>1




2, the claim is proven.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 .
Assume ﬁrst that the probability of migration is zero. Then an increase clearly beneﬁts
the other member state as it receives tax revenue from immigrants. If, however, the proba-
bility of migration increases to one and α is suﬃciently low, then the government of member
state B stops investment in internationally applicable education. Thus, an increase in γ (or
a decrease in x) improves welfare in member state A when migration is suﬃciently small,
but reduces welfare in member state A when migration is suﬃciently large.
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